When the times abandon you, you won’t even say goodbye!
After Belle International delisted and Fuguiniao declared bankruptcy, Daphne also slipped to the edge of the cliff.
After various adjustments such as closing stores, restocking online, and transforming to OEM, the former king of Chinese women’s shoes saw revenue decline by 83% last year. , gross profit fell by 82.94%.
At the same time, Daphne closed a net 183 points of sale in 2020, and the number of stores decreased from 425 at the beginning of the year to 242. Compared with the peak period of 6,881, it has decreased by 96%, and the total market value has shrunk by 98% from the peak period of more than 17 billion Hong Kong dollars.
At its peak, Daphne opened 6,881 stores in China, and its market share was close to 20%. At that time, one of every five pairs of women’s shoes sold in China came from Daphne. .
The sales of women’s shoes are extremely hot, and Daphne’s stock price is also soaring. The company’s total market value has reached 19 billion Hong Kong dollars, so that the fashion industry refers to Daphne, Fuguiniao, and Belle International as Chinese shoe companies. “Troika”.
In recent years, the “Troika” of Chinese shoe companies have fallen from the clouds to the bottom one after another: Belle International delisted in 2017, Fuguiniao declared bankruptcy in 2019, and then Daphne also fell from the altar. , fell into the dilemma of relying on OEM to survive.
On March 25 this year, Daphne disclosed its 2020 results. The company achieved revenue of HK$364 million, a year-on-year decrease of 83%; the annual loss attributable to shareholders was HK$242 million, narrowing year-on-year. 77%.
Why did Daphne, the shoe king, flourish and decline?
In fact, Daphne was once a sinking market Pioneer of the route.
Since 2002, Daphne has been expanding at a rate of more than 100 stores per year, and this expansion rate has been maintained for more than 10 years.
It adopts the method of “direct operation + joint operation + franchise” to “conquer cities and territories”. After the first-tier market is close to saturation, it turns its attention to second-tier and third-tier markets, and even counties and towns; it It does not follow the “cold” route of high-end shopping malls and focuses on massive and sophisticated “roadside stores”; its main products have always been maintained in the price range of 100 yuan to 400 yuan, and its cost performance is much higher than that of other well-known brands.
Because it not only conforms to the consumption habits of young urban white-collar workers, but does not exceed their spending power, Daphne has achieved great success, and its total market value once reached 17 billion yuan.
Unfortunately, Daphne obviously failed to keep calm in the face of huge success.
First of all, with the rise of online shopping, Daphne’s massive distribution model of offline stores has been diverted by e-commerce and other emerging retail channels. However, Daphne did not change her mind quickly. As for the online store, Daphne opened it very early, but it is only positioned as a platform for selling last orders. Its operating efficiency is not only far inferior to that of “Internet celebrity” brands that focus on online channels, but is even inferior to that of ordinary official website malls.
Secondly, Daphne does not pay enough attention to quality. As a women’s shoe brand that once led the fashion trend, in recent years, Daphne’s shoe designs have become increasingly outdated and its comfort has not improved, which has damaged the brand value that it has worked hard to accumulate.
Thirdly, when too many stores brought unaffordable financial pressure, Daphne chose simple and crude methods such as clearance sales to remove inventory. In terms of consumer experience, the shoes you just bought for 400 yuan are worth 100 yuan in two days. How can this make girls feel embarrassed?
Together, Daphne was forced to close stores and entered a vicious cycle. The slow pace of transformation is another “fatal injury” of Daphne. </p
